Functional Alarms for Systems of Interoperable Medical Devices by Venkatasubramanian, Krishna et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Departmental Papers (CIS) Department of Computer & Information Science
1-9-2014
Functional Alarms for Systems of Interoperable
Medical Devices
Krishna Venkatasubramanian
Worcester Polytechnic Institute, kven@wpi.edu
Eugene Vasserman
Kansas State University, eyv@ksu.edu
Oleg Sokolsky
University of Pennsylvania, sokolsky@cis.upenn.edu
Insup Lee
University of Pennsylvania, lee@cis.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, and the Computer Sciences Commons
15th IEEE International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering (HASE 2014), Miami, Florida, USA, January 9 - 11, 2014.
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers/767
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Krishna Venkatasubramanian, Eugene Vasserman, Oleg Sokolsky, and Insup Lee, "Functional Alarms for Systems of Interoperable
Medical Devices", 15th IEEE International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering (HASE 2014) , 247-248. January 2014.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/HASE.2014.45
Functional Alarms for Systems of Interoperable Medical Devices
Abstract
Alarms are essential for medical systems in order to ensure patient safety during deteriorating clinical
situations and inevitable device malfunction. As medical devices are connected together to become
interoperable, alarms become crucial part in making them high-assurance, in nature. Traditional alarm systems
for interoperable medical devices have been patient-centric. In this paper, we introduce the need for an alarm
system that focuses on the correct functionality of the interoperability architecture itself, along with several
considerations and design challenges in enabling them.
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Abstract—Alarms are essential for medical systems in order to
ensure patient safety during deteriorating clinical situations and
inevitable device malfunction. As medical devices are connected
together to become interoperable, alarms become crucial part
in making them high-assurance, in nature. Traditional alarm
systems for interoperable medical devices have been patient-
centric. In this paper, we introduce the need for an alarm system
that focuses on the correct functionality of the interoperability
architecture itself, along with several considerations and design
challenges in enabling them.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen the emergence of a vision of
dynamically composable and interoperable medical devices
systems. Interoperable medical devices can integrate informa-
tion from multiple clinical sources in a context-sensitive way
to guide patient care or prevent common critical mistakes [1].
Various agencies and standards bodies, including the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, have signaled that the future
of medical technology lies in medical device interoperability
[2]. Currently, devices from different manufacturers cannot
communicate except in very limited ways, so even this simple
level of coordination is hard to achieve without a standardized
interoperability protocol. High-assurance device interoperabil-
ity will be a critical requirement in realizing this vision.
Already many communication standards have been pro-
posed, and more are in development for enabling interoper-
ability in medical device systems. One of them is the ASTM
2951 standard called Integrated Clinical Environment [3], also
known as MD PnP ICE. Logically, the ICE architecture is
separated into Supervisor, Network Controller, and medical
devices, although many components may be implemented on
the same physical hardware. ICE allows coordination between
each medical device through the Network Controller, a sort of
“medical router” that does not have any medical/clinical func-
tionality itself, but is responsible for data routing, translation,
and quality of service (QoS) enforcement, and generally facili-
tating communication between devices and the Supervisor. The
Supervisor is responsible for executing “clinical workflows,”
from common and easily scriptable tasks such as taking blood
pressure at predefined intervals and recording the results, to
more complex procedures like medication interaction mon-
itoring and suppression of likely false alarms. The clinical
workflows are analogous to “apps” running on the Supervisor,
which is responsible for ensuring their isolation and directing
data flows from the devices (through the Network Controller)
to the appropriate apps. An ICE setup is customized (usually
by the appointed clinician) for each patient for whom it is
deployed, in terms of the included devices and apps.
Work is already underway to build smart alarms for ICE-like
architectures. These alarms focus on detecting patient health
deterioration by correlating information from multiple vital
sign sources [4], [5]. However, this is not sufficient for a high-
assurance interoperable system. Given the complex interaction
of medical devices, one needs to monitor the “health” and
proper functionality of the ICE itself at run-time, in addition to
reasoning about the system pre-deployment. To ensure system
safety, alarms must at least continually verify that design-time
assumptions hold at run-time. Ideally, given the safety-critical
nature of ICE, any fault or malfunction, either natural or
malicious, needs to be detected and alarm raised and addressed
by clinicians, IT personnel, and/or auditors. We refer to alarms
that focus on the health and wellbeing of the patient and
those monitoring operation of the interoperability setup itself
as patient alarms and functional alarms, respectively. From
here on, we focus on functional alarms which monitor ICE
itself rather than alarms which monitor patient health (the latter
is a job for other ICE components).
II. ICE ALARM SYSTEM (IAS)
The alarm subsystem of ICE must be carefully designed
ahead of time in order to increase our confidence in the
overall system at run-time. Alarm systems in general have
two main characteristics: the level of intelligence in iden-
tifying alarm events and their priority with minimal delay
after their occurrence, and the alarm signal which informs
of the presence of the alarm condition through various means
such as sound, vibration, or visual cues [6]. There are many
different ways in which functional alarms can be built into
ICE. The simplest is a passive alarm system that has limited
in-built intelligence. It receives triggers from the Supervisor
and informs clinicians through an alarm signal. Another option
is to have an active alarm system that is intelligent and
determines semi-autonomously when an alarm signal should
be triggered. It is the second option that increases the ICE’s
assurance level.
Viewing the ICE architecture as a device monitoring the
patient, we take the view of a centralized alarm subsystem,
called ICE Alarm System (IAS). IAS is responsible for mon-
itoring the operation of architecture components and sounding
an alarm if the operation violates specific requirements. The
alarm subsystem has its own set of requirements, i.e., variables
that it should monitor during the operation of ICE. Figure 1 is
a design sketch of ICE incorporating such an alarm subsystem,
including data flow between the components. The IAS inter-
faces directly with the Supervisor and gets cues from it to
raise alarms, especially those related to patient well-being. In
addition, the Network Controller component mirrors all ICE
traffic to the IAS. This additional information allows alarm
system logic to detect problems with ICE itself without relying
exclusively on other entities, which might themselves be faulty.
III. IAS DESIGN CHALLENGES
Most stand-alone medical devices currently come with their
own alarms which are raised if the device malfunctions or
reads patient data outside of pre-defined thresholds. How does
one reconcile the patient alarms and functional alarms raised
by the device with IAS-generated alarms? One could take two
approaches in this regard. (1) Allow the devices to alarm inde-
pendently, and use the ICE alarm only for problems with other
components, e.g., the Supervisor, logger, Network Controller,
and apps. (2) Subsume all the alarms of the medical devices,
and raise all alarms in the ICE architecture centrally. This will
require the interoperability data communication standards to
send alarm triggers from the devices to the ICE alarm system.
While centralization has its benefits, e.g., prioritization and/or
suppression of false alarms, it also comes with new problems,
such as situations where the centralized alarm malfunctions or
alarm information is lost. A better choice may be for the alarm
subsystem to observe all the entities based on traffic mirroring
by the Network Controller, and independently identify alarm
triggers in ICE.
Functional alarms generated by IAS have to focus not only
on binary situations like presence or absence of one or more
functionalities, but should also consider intermediate states
such as those involving degraded functionality. Examples
include abnormally reduced network bandwidth, and lack of
regular heart-beat signals received from individual ICE compo-
nents. Each of these cases might not directly affect the patient,
but over time, they can render ICE unsafe. Being able to detect
degraded functionality requires techniques that can decide
when the functionality degradation is serious enough to have
long-term consequences. This depends on the patient’s health
and connected ICE architecture components, and hence pre-
computation may not be possible. Reasoning about degraded
functionality at run-time is the subject of ongoing work.
ICE is a safety-critical system and has to provide high-
assurance operation. An effective alarm subsystem must be
able to detect functional problems with the entities in ICE
and inform the appropriate entities (clinicians, IT managers,
administrators, etc.). However, this is not easy to achieve in
general without making the alarm logic arbitrarily complex,
such as mirroring the entire functionality of the Supervisor and
Network Controller within the alarm subsystem. For example,
if an app on the Supervisor does not trigger a patient alarm
with the IAS when the patient’s health is deteriorating, one
needs to implement the same app functionality in the alarm
system to be able to detect it. This underscores the inherent
trade-off between what IAS should detect and the complexity
of being able to correctly implement it.
Finally, even determining the scope of IAS is a challenge.
The definitions of “deteriorating health” of a patient differ
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Fig. 1. Interoperability architecture of MD PnP ICE standard, with
the addition of an alarm subsystem and related data flows.
to detect in the general case except for simple logic, e.g.,
whether or not a patient’s heart is beating at all. Heart
rate, blood pressure, and other seemingly “simple” parameters
which signal patient health, are not as clear-cut when dealing
with the full population of potential patients. Paradoxically, if
the IAS itself malfunctions, it must be able to raise an alarm
for itself through some alternate means. This introduces the
need for a watchdog alarm system in IAS. The intelligence
required for detecting faults with IAS is very alarm specific
and may change with the design of the IAS. A watchdog alarm
for IAS is essential for improving ICE’s assurance level and
is the subject of ongoing work.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we introduced the need for a functional
alarm system for improving the assurance for ICE-based
interoperable medical devices. We categorized the alarms in
various ways based on level of built-in intelligence (passive
vs. active) and operational focus (functional vs. watchdog). We
then provided a list of challenges for designing the functional
alarms for interoperability architectures, including reconciling
multiple alarm data sources, tradeoffs between alarm sub-
system intelligence and complexity, the need for watchdog
alarms, and designing alarms that are flexible enough to
deal with degraded functionality within ICE. Our on-going
work concentrates on an IAS design that would address these
challenges.
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